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Chapter 1
Introduction
Associated with the development of a new theory, it is quite common to
observe a harsh discussion among scholars and practitioners regarding the
methodologies, the empirical data, or the stylized facts that such a theory
has to take into consideration. Conversely, it is less common that the acad-
emic debate presents some relevant criticisms at the level of the denitions
and of the objects of analysis that are usually well-dened when they are
brought to the academic attention.
This is not the case of the two-sided marketstheory that had to confront
with several complaints about the quality of its theoretical system since the
rst article by Baxter (1983) appeared. Indeed, using the words by Evans
(2006):
(w)hen the theory of two-sided markets was rst introduced it
was common to hear at least two complaints. The rst was that
there was nothing new [...]. The second was that it was a theory
of everything, and therefore nothing, since everything seems to
be two-sided(Evans, 2006, page 4).
These problems are mainly due to the origin of this literature  that
was developed by antitrust economists and practitioners and to the great
interest of these scholars regarding the pricing issues and the competitive
structure of such markets.
Still, these criticisms inspired our work so that we argue that it can be
of interest to provide a theoretical insight of the two-sided marketsdeni-
tions, rather than to o¤er a partial review of this burgeoningand recent
literature, or to propose an application of these theories.
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Therefore, in order to expose such a theoretical study, we will analyze
the di¤erent elements that are inside the denitions of two-sided markets
as they are elaborated in the articles by Rochet and Tirole (2006) and by
Rysman (2009): in particular, we will observe that according to Rochet
and Tirole (2006) two-sided markets are dened by the pricing strategies
characteristics of the producing agents; whereas, from the perspective by
Rysman (2009), the two-sidedness of a market is given by the presence of
consumption externalities across the two groups of consumers.
Moreover, focusing on the study by Rochet and Tirole (2006), we will
examine their denition throughout the approach already developed in the
Marshalls Principles (1921) regarding the joint production of multiple
commodities.
In this way, the two-sided markets theory can be reinterpreted as an
innovative evolution of the standard theory of joint production applicable
to all those web-based contexts that have been recently developed and whose
business model deals with the interaction among di¤erent groups of users.
Then, in order to clarify how this new interpretation can be descriptive
of the modeling currently used by scholars, we will examine the monopolistic
competition in two-sided markets as it has been described by Rochet and
Tirole (2003) and Armstrong (2006). In this setting, we will identify the
same dual approach that we have already met in the theoretical comparison
between the article by Rochet and Tirole (2006) and Rysman (2009): the
monopoly model by Rochet and Tirole (2003) is based on the denition by
the same authors and it can be viewed as a model with complement-in-
production goods; conversely, the model by Armstrong (2006) treats two-
sided markets using the denition proposed by Rysman (2009) so that they
share some relevant features with models with complement-in-consumption
goods.
Finally, we will study the two-part tari¤ monopoly model for two-sided
markets. First, we will describe the contribution by Rochet and Tirole
(2006) where the model proposed is able to resolve the duality about the
denitions providing a generic pricing strategy. Thus, we will dene a two-
part tari¤ model in which the joint production approach is used and a more
specic result regarding the pricing behavior of the producing agents can be
obtained.
One of the purpose of this work resides in providing an interpretation
of two-sided markets that is in line with a well-established topic in the
economic thinking, that is joint production. Throughout this interpretation,
we hope that our contribution may help to improve a real understanding of
this phenomenon so as to answer to at least a small part of the questions
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that animated the controversy regarding the two-sided marketsdenition.
Indeed, thanks to the joint production approach derived à la Marshall (1921)
we could respond to the accuses that have been stated against two-sided
markets; therefore:
1. we can propose a clear and limited object of analysis for such a theory,
so that it can be distinguished from the network literature;
2. and the factors that lead to the two-sidedness can be selected and
identied clearly.
In this way, a possible answer to the previous criticisms expressed by
Evans (2006) can be elaborated in that the two-sided marketstheory rep-
resents an updated joint production theory that can successfully describe
some new market structures. Moreover, thanks to this interpretation we
will be able to identify the cases in which a market is considered two-sided
or not.
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Chapter 2
Two Objects for One
Context
This second chapter is devoted to the presentation of the two-sided markets
literature. In particular, two main denitions will be studied in order to
identify the di¤erent objects of analysis that coexist under the same name of
two-sided markets. In this way, we will propose a common context in which
some basic characterizations are present and from this common context, we
will select two di¤erent notions reported in the literature; we will describe
the similarities derived by the common source as well as the main di¤erences
that separate the two concepts, leading to the presentation of two distinct
objects of analysis.
Hereafter, we will clarify how these two objects can be derived and ex-
plained by other approaches: in this sense the joint production and the
indirect network e¤ects will be dened and studied in a general perspective.
2.1 The Context of Two-Sided Markets
In this rst section, we are providing a general framework for two-sided
markets in order to depict the application elds in which this notion is used,
so as to evidence its main common features.
In this sense, we may start observing how the increasing importance of
digital platforms such as social networks, or payment card systems has led
to a new interest regarding the business model that is prevalent in all these
highly technological sectors.
Social networks as Facebook or internet search engines as Google and
Yahoo! are indeed all showing a similar structure in which an entity - gener-
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ally called platform - is aiming at connecting two di¤erent groups of agents,
interested in having an interaction using the services provided by the plat-
form. Associated with these services, the platform charges each group.
As we have already announced, examples of platforms are manifold: pay-
ment cards are platforms connecting two groups of users, merchants and
cardholders, that use cards in order to have no-cash transactions. Equally,
media such as newspapers or web search engines are platforms that create
interactions among advertisers and users: the newspaper readers, or the
web-users for the search engines.
All these platforms charge users depending on the group they belong to
and cross-subsidization appears to be a common factor in all these industries:
for instance, many payment cards do not charge any money to consumers
for the transactions with merchants. Still, for each transaction occurred,
merchants are paying an indirect fee that is able to compensate the costs
associated with the services provided to both sides. Similarly, web search
engines do not charge users; whereas advertisers have to pay the platform
for the ad spaces appearing on the top of the online search.
All the markets having these characteristics in common are usually named
two-sided markets.
In this way, we can generally point out two main common characteristics
of two-sided markets, according to the features present in these sectors:
1. the producing agents are called platforms and they are providing one
service to each side associated with the possibility of interactions among
two groups of end-users;
2. these two groups constitute the two sides of the market and they are
composed by users who are willing to interact via the platform to the
users of the other side.
2.2 Two Objects of Analysis
As we have just noted, multiple industries can be described using the two-
sided markets framework, since many common elements are present and
the economics of such markets seems to be dened by a similar structure.
Taking into consideration these similarities, the related literature used to
focus on the characterization of each single sector, rather than provide a
theoretical denition for the entire context. Result of this approach is the
acceptance of useful, but less general inquiries on denitions and features,
as noticed by Rochet and Tirole (2006):
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(b)ut what is a two-sided market, and why does two-sidedness
matter? On the former question, the recent literature has been
mostly industry specic and has had much of a You know a
two-sided market when you see itavor (Rochet and Tirole,
2006, pages 645-646).
However, there exist some denitions that stressed some specic elements
present in several two-sided industries, arguing that the two-sided nature is
due to the presence of such elements: in particular, we shall list two di¤erent
denitions, that can be viewed as separate descriptions for the same two-
sided market context.
According to the rst interpretation, the two-sidedness of a market is
denoted by the pricing strategy that platforms have to perform in such set-
tings: indeed a market is two-sided when the number of transitions occurring
via the platform depends on both prices charged on the two sides, and not
just on their sum; or, equally, we have a two-sided market, when the price
structure is non-neutral in the determination of the volume of transactions.
This denition was rstly introduced by Rochet and Tirole (2006), who
observed that:
(a) market is two-sided if the platform can a¤ect the volume
of transactions by charging more to one side of the market and
reducing the price paid by the other side by an equal amount;
in other words, the price structure matters, and platforms must
design it so as to bring both sides on board(Rochet and Tirole,
2006, pages 664-665).
In order to illustrate this denition with an example, we can take into
consideration the industry of payment cards. Payment card systems are used
to charge merchants for each transaction occurred with cardholders, while
consumers are often not paying any transaction fee: if suddenly payment
cards decided to switch their price structure, charging heavily consumers for
each transaction and providing for free their services to merchants (keeping
xed the overall price), the volumes of transactions, and thus their prots,
would be probably much lower. Thus, the sum of the two prices charged
is not su¢ cient to determine the level of prot by the payment cards: the
price structure is thus non-neutral in this setting.
While this rst interpretation deals with the pricing strategy of the plat-
form, the second denition regards some properties about the two groups of
users and their benets to join the platform.
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Indeed, many authors noticed that in all the markets dened two-sided,
the benets that users from each side are receiving by joining the platform
are a¤ected (positively or negatively) by the presence of the users on the
other side.
For payment cards systems, the nature of these interdependencies
among the two sides is straightforward: consumers are willing to use a card
only when many merchants are accepting it; whereas, merchants are willing
to accept a card (and so pay for each transfer), only when many consumers
are using it.
Thus, according to this second denition, the two-sidedness of the mar-
kets is just a consequence of the presence of these interconnections among
the two groups of users; thus, as Rysman (2009) noted:
a two-sided market is one in which 1) two sets of agents interact
through an intermediary or platform, and 2) the decisions of
each set of agents a¤ects the outcomes of the other set of agents,
typically through an externality(Rysman, 2009, page 125).
To be more specic, the kinds of externalities recalled by Rysman (2009)
are commonly called adoption externalities and they often rely on the pres-
ence of indirect network e¤ects among the two sides.1 In this way, they are
treated as a specic case of consumption externalities for which one groups
benet from joining a platform depends on the size of the other group that
joins the platform(Armstrong, 2006, page 668).
2.2.1 Similarities and Di¤erences
These two di¤erent denitions are willing to interpret the same economic
interactions among agents. In this way, similarities are necessarily shared
1The literature on direct and indirect network e¤ects is wide and it cannot be described
here with su¢ cent precision. However, using the words by Church and Gandal (2008), it
is possible to have a rst understanding of the nature of indirect network e¤ects:
(w)hen the network e¤ect is indirect, [. . . ] individuals care about the
decisions of others because of the e¤ect that has on the incentive for the
provision of complementary products. Users of Macintosh computers are
better o¤ the greater the number of consumers who purchase Macs because
the larger the number of Mac users the greater the demand for compatible
software, which if matched by an appropriate supply response entry by
software rms will lead to lower prices and/or a greater variety of software
which makes all Mac users better o¤(Church and Gandal, 2008, page 1).
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among the two notions because of their common source. Still, these two
denitions do not collide since two separate objects are analyzed and char-
acterized from a theoretical perspective so as in the modeling.
In order to express the di¤erences and recognize the common points
between the two denitions, the relations between the two conditions that
characterized these notions may be commented.
According to the rst interpretation by Rochet and Tirole (2006), the
non-neutrality of the price structure is the core element to dene a two-
sided market; conversely, from the perspective expressed by Rysman (2009)
and other authors, the presence of consumption externalities among the
sides guarantee a two-sided structure. At this stage, it may be of interest
to reckon whether it is possible to derive one condition (for example, the
non-neutrality of the price structure) from the other one (the presence of
externalities between the two sides), so as to clarify the descriptive limits of
the these two denitions.
We can generally notice that the presence of externalities a¤ects the
pricing strategies of the platforms and in some context it coexists with a
non-neutral price structure. Indeed, quoting again Rysman, (p)ricing to
one side of the market depends not only on the demand and costs that those
consumers bring, but also on how their participation a¤ects participation on
the other side (Rysman, 2009, page 129); thus the success of a platform
is heavily derived by the capacity to attract users on both sides, exploiting
the positive externalities created by having on board a greater participation
level.
The case of payment card systems is again instructive in this sense: as
we have already examined, payment cards are usually charging higher trans-
action fees to merchants, rather than to cardholders, so that, charging more
or less one side a¤ects the number of transactions. At the same time, the
presence of users on one side a¤ects the benets received by the other sides
consumers and thus externalities in the consumption can be recognized.
Thus, payment card systems can be described simultaneously by the two
denitions, in that both the necessary conditions are present in this setting.
However, when Rochet and Tirole (2006) expressed their denition, they
clearly stated that their focus was on the non-neutrality of the price structure
and that consumption externalities do not guarantee in every contexts this
condition.
In this sense, Rochet and Tirole listed some other factors that can be
added to a framework with consumption externalities, so that a non-neutral
price structure may be achieved: in particular, they pointed out that the
non-neutrality of the price structure arises when the two sides cannot di-
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rectly bargain without the use of the platform. Therefore, the presence of
transaction costs, or the prohibition on the pricing of transactions between
groups can be seen as the elements leading to a non-neutral price structure
and thus to a two-sided market.
We can illustrate this point with an example regarding night clubs that
charge di¤erently men and women. They can be seen as two-sided platforms,
whose sides are given by the groups of men and women who are willing to
join the club. In this context, consumption externalities seem to be present
among groups because a great number of women will attract more men and
vice versa.
At this stage, following the reasoning by Rochet and Tirole, the price
structure will be neutral just if the two groups of users are not able to
bargain among each other and act collectively.
In this sense, let us suppose that men and women can directly bargain:
in particular, let us consider the case in which a couple composed by a man
and a woman wants to join the club. If the couple acts as a single agent and
they are willing to buy two tickets to join the club, the price structure will
be considered neutral by these agents, in that only the sum of the two prices
matters for them. Conversely, when men and women act as single agents
and thus the bargain is not possible, the price structure is non-neutral and
the club can be seen as a two-sided platform.
Therefore, we can conclude that the two denitions of two-sided markets
are not opposite in that the non-neutrality of the price structure is not
excluding the presence of externalities and vice versa. Yet, it is necessary
to observe that according to these two denitions, the sets of markets that
can be dened two-sided are di¤erent and consequently, the two denitions
are describing two separate, non-equivalent objects.
2.3 Two-Sided Markets As Joint Production
In the next two parts of this chapter, we will try to identify the di¤erent
objects described by the two denitions of two-sided markets, tracing the
inner structure that is behind them. In this way, we will investigate the orig-
inality of the two-sided market literature, noticing that the features hitherto
presented may be explained through other theories, or approaches.
First of all, we can observe that, according to the denition by Rochet
and Tirole (2006), two-sided markets can be treated as markets in which
rms have a joint production of two goods; or equally, they are producing
two complement-in-production goods.
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We can remind that two goods are complement-in-production if they are
generated by the same rm as two di¤erent outcomes of the same production
process. Once a rm produces one of these goods, it is producing also the
other good, whose production is triggered by the production of the rst
good.
Examples of complement-in-production goods are common in many pro-
duction processes: among others, many agricultural goods such as wheat
and hay, or the products originated from the petroleum processing used
by the chemical industry are all cases in which a single production process
provides a multiple number of outputs that are produced jointly.
After this brief denition of a joint production setting, the connection
between two-sided markets and complementarities in production may be
established although, at the rst glance, they appear to be distant: indeed,
while rms with joint production of two goods cannot produce one product
without triggering the production of the other one, two-sided platforms have
to get on boardthe two sides, charging di¤erently the two groups of end-
users.
Yet, as soon as interactions between the two sides are the main elements
of the services provided by two-sided platforms, their production process
will be such that it is not possible to provide one service without providing
the other one, in that the interaction created by these platforms requires
the joint presence of the two sides.
In order to capture the e¢ cacy of this denition, we may reinterpret the
problem depicted in one of the rst articles studying the two-sided setting
by Caillaud and Jullien (2003). In this article, the two authors presented the
so called chicken & egg problem that characterizes all the platforms acting
in a two-sided context:
to attract buyers, an intermediary should have a large base of
registered sellers, but these will be willing to register only if they
expect many buyers to show up (Caillaud and Jullien, 2003,
page 310).
In the same article, Caillaud and Jullien are ascribing this problem to the
presence of network externalities among the two sides; still, they are stressing
the fact that platforms have to attract buyers and sellers simultaneously and
thus they are implicitly suggesting that it is not feasible for the platform to
have a disjoint provision of the two services.
In this way, it seems reasonable to reformulate the chicken & egg problem
by Caillaud and Jullien (2003) in terms of joint production: the production
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process of two-sided intermediaries is such that they cannot increase the
number of end-users present in one side, independently of the number of
users on the other side; thus, as a farmer can modify by a certain degree the
quantity of wheat and hay jointly produced, here the platform can attract
just a limited number of buyers, given a xed amount of sellers on the other
side.
Therefore, using the denition proposed by Rochet and Tirole (2006),
two-sided markets may be considered as a new declination of the past theo-
ries regarding the joint production, whose context is updated with the recent
development of IT and computer science.
In this way, we cast doubts regarding the real originality of such a con-
cept in that the joint production theories were already studied by many
economists during the evolution of the economic thought:2 among others,
the contribution by Marshall is of a particular interest, in that he was able to
provide a useful characterization for this concept, studying it in the specic
framework of his analysis of partial equilibrium.
According to Marshall, the complement-in-production goods3 are things
which cannot easily be produced separately(Marshall, 1921, book V, chap-
ter VI, page 388). In this sense, they may be treated as one single product
when we are considering the production process from which they are origi-
nated; conversely, they have to be viewed as two separate goods when they
are o¤ered to the markets, in that they are associated with two di¤erent and
separate demands:
(i)f the causes which govern their production are nearly the
same, they may for many purposes be treated as one commodity.
For instance, beef and mutton may be treated as varieties of
one commodity for many purposes; but they must be treated as
separate for others, as for instance for those in which the question
of the supply of wool enters (Marshall, 1921, book V, chapter
VI, page 391).
Following the same example given by Marshall in this passage, we may
observe that the two commodities wool and mutton are parts of an aggre-
gate commodity when they are studied in terms of the producers supply:
2For a precise focus on the analyses of classical and early neoclassical economists re-
garding the case of joint production, see Kurz (1986).
3 In the original text by Marshall, the term complement-in-production goodsis not
used since it was preferred the term joint products. Here we do not discuss the pos-
sibile di¤erences between these two notions and we treat the case of complementarity in
production as a case of joint production.
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in this sense, Marshall named composite supply the joint production of
commodities. Di¤erently, the demands associated with the two commodities
are disjoint in that two di¤erent groups of consumers are interested in the
commodities wool and mutton and there are no consumers interested in the
composite commodity.
Thanks to this reasoning, we can conclude our presentation regarding
the similarities between these two concepts observing that, according to
contribute by Marshall (1921, book V, chapter VI, page 388), the essential
property for two-sided markets - that is the non-neutrality condition for the
price structure - can be derived also in a joint production setting, assuming
that there are no cross-group transactions or bargaining between agents.
2.3.1 Non-Neutrality and Joint Production
Marshall (1921) studied the determination of prices in a case of two comple-
ment-in-production goods produced in xed proportion: in particular, he
considered the production of the commodities meat and leather originated
from the commodity bullock ; so that from one unit of bullock, one unit of
meat and one unit of leather are produced. These proportions are xed and
thus it is not possible to have di¤erent production ratios between meat and
leather from one unit of bullock.
From this characteristics, we can easily derive a feature regarding the
prices of bullocks, meat, and leather: let us dene the price for one unit of
bullock as pB; then, since one unit of meat and one unit of leather can be
produced from one unit of bullock, the price of one unit of meat and one
unit of leather is equal to pB. Thus, naming the price of meat and of the
leather with pM and pL respectively, we have that pB = pM + pL.
Keeping in mind this condition on prices pB; pM and pL, we can derive
the supply and the demands associated with the goods bullock, meat and
leather, as expressed by Marshall (1921, book V, chapter VI, pages 388-389,
footnote 3).4
Composite Supply of Bullock
As we have already sketched, Marshall used the term composite supplyin
order to dene the joint supply of the complement-in-production goods by
4Our analysis of the equilibrium conditions in a case of complementarities in production
is using the work by Marshall with some signicant changes, in order to simplify and clarify
the exposition. In order to have an explanatory description of the original Marshalls
reasoning, see Kurz (1986, page 30).
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the rm. In this case, the composite supply of the complement-in-production
goods meat and leather can be dened as the supply of the good bullock,
that is the joint production of meat and leather.
In this way, we can dene the supply function SB(pB) that is expressing
the relationship between the quantity of the commodity bullock produced
and o¤ered on the market and its price pB. As Marshall implicitly assumed,
the supply function SB(pB) can be characterized by a strictly positive deriv-
ative with respect to the price pB, so that
@SB(pB)
@pB
> 0 8pB 2 R:
Demands for Meat and Leather
As we have previously evidenced, the demands of meat and leather can be
treated separately so that we can denote two functions DM (pM ) and DL(pL)
that are relating the quantities demanded of meat and leather to their prices
pM and pL. In order to simplify the exposition, we are assuming that both
demands have a strictly negative derivative with respect to the associated
prices, so that @DM (pM )@pM < 0 8pM 2 R and
@DL(pL)
@pL
< 0 8pL 2 R:
Then, recalling that the two products have to be supplied jointly so
as to produce one unit of meat with one unit of leather, we can derive a
composite demand function of bullock (that is, meat and leather together),
by the vertical summation of the two di¤erent demand functions, as shown
in Figure 1.
Indeed, we can observe that the demanded quantity q of meat is as-
sociated with the price pM ; while the demand of the same amount q
 of
leather is related to the price pL. In this way, the demanded quantities in
the markets of meat and leather will be both equal to q when the associated
prices are pM and p

L. Yet, we can translate these two conditions in order
to derive the composite demand of bullock, stating that, when the price is
equal to pB = p

M + p

L; the demand of bullock will equal q
: from q units
of bullocks, q units of meat and leather will be demanded at prices of pM
and pL respectively.
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Figure 1
After having composed the demand function DB(pB) by the two di¤er-
ent demands DM (pM ) and DL(pL), we can pass to derive the equilibrium
condition in terms of bullock. Marshall investigated the case of perfect com-
petition, where the composite supply and the composite demand equate at
the equilibrium; at this stage, we are going to present such a result in the
perfect competition setting, recalling that the monopoly and oligopoly cases
shall be derived easily.
In this way, equating the composite supply of bullock SB(pB) with the
demand of bullock DB(pB), we nd the quantity produced and sold at the
equilibrium qE and the equilibrium price pEB:
SB(p
E
B) = q
E = DB(p
E
B):
However, this equilibrium price level pEB is composed by a price structure
(pEM and p
E
L ), describing the equilibrium prices in both markets of meat and
leather: thus, at the equilibrium, the breeders are producing and selling
qE units of bullock, or equally qE units of meat and qE units of leather;
accordingly, for each unit of bullock they are receiving a price pEB = p
E
M +p
E
L :
pEM for one unit of meat and p
E
L for one unit of leather.
As we can see in Figure 2, associated with the equilibrium in the com-
posite good bullock, the other equilibrium conditions in the markets of meat
and leather are the following:
pEM + p
E
L = p
E
B
and
SB(p
E
B) = DB(p
E
B) = DM (p
E
M ) = DL(p
E
L ):
In this way, recalling that:
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 from one unit of bullock, only one unit of meat and one unit of leather
can be produced;
 the two demands for meat and leather are strictly decreasing in their
prices;
 while the supply for bullock is strictly increasing in the price pB;
we can state that there exists just one possible combination of prices pEM
and pEL , so that:
SB(p
E
B) = DB(p
E
B) = DM (p
E
M ) = DL(p
E
L )
and
pEM + p
E
L = p
E
B.
For this reason, we can reckon that the price structure is non-neutral to
determine the equilibrium condition in this simple setting where complemen-
tarities in the production are present: if the breeder decides to charge two
prices p0M and p
0
L so that p
0
M+p
0
L = p
E
B, but p
0
M 6= pEM and p0L 6= pEL , then the
equilibrium condition is not respected since SB(pEB) 6= DM (p0M ) 6= DL(p0L).
Figure 2
In the same way, we can get a similar result regarding the non-neutrality
of the price structure when we study the monopoly and the oligopoly set-
tings. Indeed, applying the previous composition for the demand of the
composite commodity bullock, it is possible to obtain similar outcomes ap-
plied to the monopolistic competition, or the oligopoly à la Cournot.
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Starting from the same assumptions regarding the monotonic behav-
ior of the two demands for meat and leather (strictly decreasing in their
prices), the monopoly equilibrium quantity qMB can be dened for the mar-
ket of bullocks, equating the marginal revenues and the marginal costs of
the monopolist:
MR(qMB ) = MC(q
M
B ):
In particular, we have to recall that, as the market supply is derived
with respect to the composite commodity bullock in the perfect competition
case, even the monopolist revenue and cost functions are calculated in terms
of bullocks.
Yet, the equilibrium price structure associated with the equilibrium
quantity qMB and the equation MR(q
M
B ) = MC(q
M
B ) is uniquely dened
in that the proportions of leather and meat derived by one unit of bullock
are xed and qMB is the monopoly equilibrium production of bullock, meat,
and leather.
In the very same way, the equilibrium quantities in the Cournot oligopoly
will be related to a specic price level, that is deriving a unique non-neutral
price structure due to the monotonic assumptions of the demand functions
of the two goods: meat and leather.
2.4 Two-SidedMarkets From Indirect Network Ef-
fects
Whereas in the previous section we investigated the strict connection be-
tween two-sided markets as they are dened by Rochet and Tirole (2006)
and joint production, in this section we aim at recalling how the notion
of two-sided structures by Rysman (2009) can be directly derived from the
standard literature of the indirect network e¤ects.
However, before starting this comparison, we have to remind that de-
nitions à la Rysman, stressing the presence of consumption externalities
among the two sides, are common in many articles, especially in that part
of the literature focused on the economic implications of competition among
rms in a two-sided context. For instance, from the Chois (2010) perspec-
tive (t)he dening characteristics of two-sided markets are indirect network
e¤ects or inter-group network externalities that arise through improved op-
portunities to trade with the other side of the market (Choi, 2010, page
608); or, according to Evans (2003), two-sided markets are those markets in
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which there are two classes of customers, and each type of customer values
the service only if the other also buys the service(Evans, 2003, page 3).
In this sense, when we want to establish a connection between the de-
nition of two-sided market provided by Rysman (2009) and the literature of
indirect network e¤ects, we are considering all the set of articles and works
that used this interpretation related to consumption externalities.
In order to proceed with this comparison, we have to notice that Rysman
(2009) directly observed this relationship in his article:
in a technical sense, the literature on two-sided markets could
be seen as a subset of the literature on network e¤ects(Rysman,
2009, page 127).
As far as this denition concerned, a two-sided market is a market in
which indirect network e¤ects are conditioning the connections established
by the platform between the two groups of end-users; and in this way, the
emphasis on market intermediaries is the unique relevant variance to the
general characterization of network theory.
Indeed, the literature of indirect network e¤ects generally deals with
the consumers perspective and it rarely stresses the pricing implications
regarding rms.
An interesting example of this approach can be recalled by the descrip-
tion of the software-hardware industry by Church and Gandal (2008) that
was already presented in footnote (1). According to the indirect network
literature, the description of such an industry is based on the complemen-
tarities in the consumption that characterize users: as previously explained
by Church and Gandal, the utility that users are perceiving by using a
computer hardware is greater, the higher is the number of software that are
compatible5 with this hardware. Equally, for software developers it is clearly
more protable to develop software for those hardware with a great number
of users.
Due to these interdependencies between software and hardware, indirect
network e¤ects arises and the economics of these markets can be described.
Conversely, two-sided markets theories are describing this industry from
the perspective of the hardware rms, that are the platforms of this market:
indeed they have to charge two di¤erent prices for software developers and
users so as to internalize the complementarities perceived by the consumers.
5From this perspective, many contributes have been written in order to explain the
nature of the compatibility between goods. Among others, see Gilbert (1992) and David
and Greenstein (1990).
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However, the setting described remains the same and the unique di¤erence
of the two-sided approach is given by the platform-based focus.
This latter focus could lead to the identication of a platform pricing
strategy that may be in accordance with the non-neutrality of the price
structure, as it is pointed out by the other denition. However, accord-
ing to this interpretation, this second conditioning regarding the platforms
pricing rules is not necessary to dene a two-sided market: it is uniquely
characterized by the indirect network e¤ects occurring between the sides.
For this reason, we can conclude that part of the literature about two-
sided markets intends itself as an analysis of the behavior of rms facing
indirect network e¤ects, without any other pricing implication.
Therefore the nal results of such models shall be in accordance with the
indirect network approach as their key elements are directly derived from
these schemes and no further elements are added to this environment.
20
Chapter 3
Two-Sided Monopoly and
Joint Production
In this chapter we develop the parallelism between the two-sided market
denition proposed by Rochet and Tirole (2006) and joint production in the
monopoly setting.
To do so, we will describe the monopoly model by Rochet and Tirole
(2003) in which two relevant elements are present: a non-neutral monopo-
list platforms price structure and consumption externalities across the two
sides.
At the same time, we will propose a characterization for the prot func-
tion of a monopolist producing two complement-in-production commodities.
In this way, we will show that this joint production setting can model two-
sided markets and, adding positive consumption externalities, it produces
the same outcomes of the Rochet and Tirole (2003) model.
Accordingly, we will be able to note the di¤erent elements of this model
so as to understand the role played by the presence of externalities and by
the joint production.
3.1 The Model by Rochet and Tirole (2003)
In the article Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets, Rochet and
Tirole (2003) introduced a two-sided market monopoly model, where a mo-
nopolist platform connects two sides, named side 1and side 2, charging
both with per-transaction fees p1 and p2.1
1 In the original paper by Rochet and Tirole (2003), the two sides are called buyers
and sellers in that this model was used to characterize the payment card industry; in
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Associated with each transaction, the platform is incurring marginal per-
transaction costs c > 0, so that the platforms margin for each transaction
is dened by the expression (p1 + p2   c).
In this way, since no other fees and costs are present, the platforms
prot function is given by the product between the per-transaction margin
(p1+p2 c) and the total number of transactions occurring via the platform.
At this stage, an important assumption has to be recalled: in order
to deduce the total number of transactions from the numbers of agents,
the two authors assumed that each agent joining the platform has one and
only one transaction with all the users on the other side. If the number
of users on side 1 and 2 is respectively N1 and N2; the total number of
transactions will be given by the product N1N2: each user on side 1 is having
N2 transactions (one for each user on the other side), and thus, summing
up all the transactions for any user on side 1, we will get the total number
of transactions N1 N2:
In this way, the platforms prot function is dened as follows:
 = (p1 + p2   c)N1N2:
As we will see in the following sections of this chapter, this model respects
the denition of two-sided market given by the same authors (Rochet and
Tirole, 2006): the monopolist platform is charging the two sides with a price
structure (p1; p2) that is non-neutral in determining the optimal volume of
transactions and the optimal platforms prot.
However, we have to notice that this model is presenting consumption
externalities across the two sides and in this way, it is also satisfying the
notion of two-sided market according to Rysman (2009) and others.
In order to detect these consumption externalities, we can dene two
demand functions D1; D2 for the platforms services so that, on each side,
the access to the platform by users is depending on the per-transaction price
charged and on the number of users present on the other side. Thus, positive
consumption externalities are present across the two sides and D1; D2 can
be dened as follows:8<:
D1 = N1(p1)N^2
D2 = N2(p2)N^1;
where N^1,N^2 are the numbers of users on the two sides observed from the
opposite side; while Ni(pi) with i 2 f1; 2g is assumed to be a non-negative
the same way, the per-transaction prices are denoted as pB and pS :
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decreasing log-concave function of the price pi.2 According to this
characterization, the demand for the platforms services increases, the
higher is the number of users observed on the other side, as it is shown by
Figure 3: keeping xed the per-transaction price pi , the demand on side i
will be greater when the observed number of users on side j goes from NBj
to NAj ; with N
A
j > N
B
j :
Figure 3
In this setting, users cannot internalize the positive externalities in that
they are considering the number of users on the other side as given; yet, these
externalities can be internalized by the platform since it is simultaneously
charging the two sides with p1 and p2:
Thus, from the platforms perspective, the two demands are equal and
they are dened in the same way:
Di = Ni(pi)Nj(pj) 8i; j 2 f1; 2g ;
whereas the platforms revenue function R(p1; p2) is the following:
R(p1; p2) = p1D1 + p2D2
= p1 N1(p1)N2(p2) + p2N1(p1)N2(p2)
= (p1 + p2)N1(p1)N2(p2):
Finally, from the previous assumption regarding the number of transac-
tions and the associated cost function (cN1 N2), the prot function  can
be dened again:
2This assumption is present in many articles regarding two-sided markets (see Rochet
and Tirole (2006)) and it plays a decisive role in the prot maximization. For futher
comments on this, see Weyl (2008).
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 = (p1 + p2)N1(p1)N2(p2)  cN1(p1)N2(p2)
= (p1 + p2   c)N1(p1)N2(p2):
As we have just noticed, this simple characterization of the prot func-
tion is based on the presence of positive externalities on the usersdemands
and on the assumption that each user on one side has one and only one
transaction with all the users on the other side. Yet, we may argue that this
last assumption is unsatisfactory to many extents, in that it is restricting
this model to a very particular case that is seldom veried in most actual
situations.
However, inasmuch as we are interested in the nal conclusions of the
model by Rochet and Tirole (2003), we can proceed in determining the
optimal pricing strategy of the platform in this setting, recalling that all the
results are based on this assumption.
3.1.1 The Price Structure and the Price Level
The prot optimization process starts recognizing that in the two-sided set-
ting the optimal price levels are not the unique results we are willing to
derive, since a further element a¤ecting the platforms pricing strategy re-
gards the price structure, that is how the total price p = p1 + p2 is shared
between the two groups of end-users.
For this reason, we will rstly obtain the optimal price structure that
the platform has to x in order to maximize the volume of transactions for
any price level p; then, as a second step, we will dene the optimal price
level p, for which the platforms prot function is maximized.
The Optimal Price Structure
The rst step of the prot optimization procedure deals with the optimal
price structure selected by the platform, independently of the total level of
the per-transaction price p = p1 + p2. In this sense, pointing out that
the platforms prot function is given by the product between the per-
transaction margin (p   c) and the total volume of transactions, we may
maintain that, when the price structure is maximized independently of the
price level p, the per-transaction margin remains undened, since it de-
pends only on the total price charged p; whereas the volume of transactions
is maximized for a general level of p.
In this way, the maximized volume of transactions V (p) will be dened
as:
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V (p) = max fN1(p1)N2(p2); s.t.: p1 + p2 = pg :
Interestingly, this maximized volume V (p) is not constrained by the usual
assumptions related to the positiveness of the sides prices (p1  0; p2 
0) since the two-sided nature of the market let the prices be varying in
a larger range, so that one side may be subsidized by the price charged
to the other side and the platform can charge a negative price, that is a
monetary incentive, on this side. Clearly, it is not possible that both prices
are negative, but, by construction, this case is never feasible.
In order to obtain the optimal level V (p); we consider the following
Lagrangian function:
L(p1; p2; )=N1(p1)N2(p2)  (p1 + p2   p);
whose related rst-order conditions are:8>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>:
@L
@p1
=
@N1
@p1
N2    = 0
@L
@p2
=
@N2
@p2
N1    = 0
@L
@
= p1 + p2   p = 0:
A rst characterization of the optimal volume V (p)3 can be stated de-
noting a relationship between the derivatives of the volumes with respect to
the prices: indeed using the rst two conditions, we get:
@N1
@p1
N2 = @N2
@p2
N1;
yet, we can easily recognize that the left hand side is the derivative of the
volume V (p) with respect to the price p1; while the right hand side is the
derivative of V (p) with respect to the price p2. Hence, the optimal price
structure condition provides that the derivatives of V (p) with respect to
the two prices are equal:
3Reminding that both N1(p1) and N2(p2) are log-concave and that the product of two
log-concave functions is still log-concave, we can observe that the FOCs are the necessary
and su¢ cient conditions to describe the optimum for this maximization problem.
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@V (p)
@p1
=
@V (p)
@p2
:
Moreover, a second result can be exploited in order to characterize the
relative magnitude of the two prices p1 and p2: Indeed, dividing both sides
of the previous condition for a factor equal to (N1N2), we get:
@N1
@p1
 1
N1
=
@N2
@p2
 1
N2
:
This equation can be signicantly simplied recalling the notion of elas-
ticity of demand4 with respect to prices: indeed, we can denote with i
the elasticity of demand on side i with respect to the price pi, so that
i =   piNi 
@Ni
@pi
: In this way, the previous formula can be written as follows:
1
p1
=
2
p2
:
Thus, the ratio between the two prices will be given by the ratio of the
elasticities:
p1
p2
=
1
2
:
Using this expression, we can dene the optimal price ratio so as to
be given by the relation of elasticities (and not the inverse elasticities)
(Rochet and Tirole, 2003, page 997).
Further in this section we will focus on this result since many authors
claimed that it may be counterintuitive and misleading, while, thanks to the
contribute by Krueger (2009), it can be plainly explained using a straight-
forward economic interpretation.
The Optimal Price Level
After having dened some characterizations for the optimal pricing struc-
ture, the platform can optimize its prot function with respect to the total
per-transaction price p: However, this maximization process is not di¤erent
to the standard optimization that we used to study for a one-sided mo-
nopolist: indeed in this case, denoting with V (p) the maximized volume
4Here and in the next sections we use the term elasticity of demand since the number
of users Ni is confused with the term demand in many articles. To be more precise, we
should say elasticity of the number of users.
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of transactions, the prot function is  = (p   c)V (p) and the rst-order
condition of the price p is derived as usual:5
@
@p
= V (p) + (p  c)  @V (p)
@p
= 0:
The margin (p  c) can be calculated as:
(p  c) =  V (p) 

@V (p)
@p
 1
:
However, we can recall that the previous price structure optimization
leads to the condition for which the derivatives of the volume V (p) with
respect to p1 and p2 are equal, and thus we can easily reckon that:
@V (p)
@p
=
@V (p)
@p1
=
@V (p)
@p2
:
In this way, we have that:
(p c) =  V (p)

@V (p)
@p
 1
=  V (p)

@V (p)
@p1
 1
=  V (p)

@V (p)
@p2
 1
;
or, substituting the values found in the previous optimization process:
(p  c) =  V (p) 

@V (p)
@p
 1
=   N1N2
@N1
@p1
N2
=   N1N2
@N2
@p2
N1
:
Using again the concept of elasticity, so that i =   piNi 
@Ni
@pi
with i 2
f1; 2g ; we can simplify the formula so that:
(p  c) = 11
p1
=
1
2
p2
;
or equally:
5The FOCs are su¢ cient to derive the optimum even in this maximization process, due
to the previous assumption regarding the log-concavity of the demand functions.
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(p1 + p2   c) = p1
1
=
p2
2
:
A new Lerner formula can be explicitated for both sides as follows:
pi   (c  pj)
pi
=
1
i
with i; j 2 f1; 2g :
In this formulation, the e¤ects of an increase in the price on side i
are measured considering the features of two-sided markets and the mar-
ket power associated with this setting: if in one-sided settings the market
power is dened as the price charged by the rm (in this case, the platform)
minus the marginal cost; in two-sided markets, it is dened as the di¤erence
between the price charged on one side and the opportunity cost of charging
it.
This opportunity cost is calculated by detecting the costs associated with
raising the price on one side (side i) so that the total number of transactions
is diminished by one.
Indeed, c is the cost that is not incurred by the platform without the
transaction; whereas pj denes the revenues that would have obtained charg-
ing the other side.
Therefore we can reckon that the overall opportunity cost of charging a
higher price is (c  pj).
This point is e¤ectively expressed by Rochet and Tirole (2006):
[:::] the loss of a transaction on side i due to an increase in the
per-transaction price pi has an opportunity cost (c   pj), since
the platform cost c of the transaction has to be defrayed by the
payment pj levied on the other side(Rochet and Tirole, 2006,
page 665).
3.1.2 The Elasticity Pricing Rule
In the previous section, the price structures optimization led to a result that
many authors have dened against the economic intuition and the stylized
facts of many markets such as the payment cards industry. This result deals
with the ratio of the prices charged by the platform and the relationship
that this ratio has with the elasticities of the number of users on each side.
In particular, as we have already observed, the price structure is given by
the relation of elasticities, so that we can write:
p1
p2
=
1
2
:
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According to this result, the group of end-users with the most elastic
demand should be charged with the highest price by the platform; while the
group with the most rigid demand should be characterized by the lowest
price.
However, this result seems to be in contrast with the well-known relation-
ship dened by the Lerner index in the standard one-sided monopoly con-
dition: indeed, according to the classical Lerner formula, the price charged
by the monopolist is related to the inverse of the elasticity (p
M c
c =
1
 ).
Furthermore, this result appears to be not able to describe properly the
reality of certain two-sided markets in which the subsidized segment, that
is the segment charged with a lower price, is usually the one characterized
by a more elastic demand: for instance, in the payment cards industry, we
can think that cardholders, the subsidized segment, have a more elastic
demand than merchants, the subsidizing segment.
However, these observations can be considered problematic, only if the
elasticity of demand is treated as a parameter. If elasticity is treated as
function of price, the Rochet-Tirole rule is perfectly in line with economic
intuition(Krueger, 2009, page 271).
When we argue that one side, for example side 1, is characterized by a
higher elasticity of demand than side 2, we are indeed stating that, for any
prices charged by the platform, the elasticity of side 1 is greater than the
one of side 2; so that, more formally, we can write:
1(p1)  2(p2) whenever p1 = p2:
However we cannot forget that in two-sided markets, the optimal price
structure does not require that prices are equal (generally p1 6= p2) and we
do not exactly know the relation of the elasticities for such di¤erent prices.
In this sense, at the optimal price structure, the level of the elasticity of the
demand of cardholders (that in our case are the users of group 1), might be
even lower than the level of merchantselasticity: therefore, high elasticity
may be the result of high price - not the cause. Similarly, low elasticity may
be caused by low price(Krueger, 2009, page 273).
To explain better this result in accordance with the economic intuition,
we can show that is more protable to raise prices for the relatively inelastic
group and lower them for the relatively elastic group when the two groups
are charged equally, but the elasticities of the two groups are di¤erent. Let
the group 1 be more elastic than group 2, so that we can write as before
that:
1(p1)  2(p2) whenever p1 = p2:
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Then, let us assume that the rst derivatives of the elasticities with
respect to prices are positive for both sides;6 and that, in correspondence
with the common price p1 = p2, the demand on both sides are equal (N1 =
N2); as we can see in Figure 4.
Figure 4
At this stage, two di¤erent strategies can be implemented by the plat-
form, maintaining xed the overall price p = p1 + p2: Following the strategy
A, the platform increases the price for the group 1 (with the greatest elas-
ticity) by an amount , while the price for the group 2 will be decreased by
the same amount : In this way, pA1 = p1 + ; while p
A
2 = p2 : In corre-
spondence with these new prices, the demands on both sides are changing:
in particular, NA1 < N1 and N
A
2 > N2:
Di¤erently, according to the strategy B, the monopolist platform charges
the two sides in the opposite way, still keeping xed the overall price: pB1 =
p1    and pB2 = p2 + : Even in this case, the demands on both sides
change, with NB1 > N1 and N
B
2 < N2:
However, as Figure 3 shows, the e¤ects on the demands of these price
modications are di¤erent and have di¤erent impact on the total prot of the
platform. In particular, since the demand of the group 1 is more elastic than
6As we can easily derive: di
dpi
= pi
(Ni)2

h
@Ni
@pi
i2
  1
Ni
 @Ni
@pi
  pi
Ni
 @2Ni
@p2i
that is always
positive when
h
@Ni
@pi
i2
> @
2Ni
@p2i
Ni: In particular the last condition holds true for log-concave
demand functions and for linear functions where @
2Ni
@p2i
= 0:
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the one of group 2 we will have that NB1 > N
A
2 and N
B
2 > N
A
1 : Therefore
it is straightforward to observe that the nal outcomes on the prot of the
platform are di¤erent and strategy B leads to greater prot than strategy
A: indeed, the overall level of the price p remains xed, while the volumes
changes. In particular we will have:
A = (p  c)NA1 NA2 and B = (p  c)NB1 NB2 ;
Yet, as we have already shown, the product NA1 N
A
2 is lower than the
product NB1 N
B
2 in that N
B
1 > N
A
2 and N
B
2 > N
A
1 :
In this way, we have demonstrated that the prot of the platform is
greater when the most elastic group is less charged, in line with the actual
outcomes of the payment cards industry and the other two-sided markets.
3.2 The Joint Production Monopoly
In the second chapter we already described the similarities that are present
from a theoretical perspective between a two-sided market (dened as a
market with a non-neutral price structure) and a joint production case. At
this stage, we are aiming at extending these connections to the monopoly
model.
In the previous section, we have described the two-sided monopoly model
elaborated by Rochet and Tirole (2003) in which the price structure is non-
neutral and positive externalities are present across the sides. Di¤erently, in
this section we are going to translate the theoretical elements of joint pro-
duction inside the prot function of a monopolist rm: in this way, we shall
observe that the joint production monopoly model can describe a two-sided
condition and when positive externalities are added to the joint production
approach, the nal outcomes derived by Rochet and Tirole (2003) can be
achieved.
Let us consider a monopolist rm that is producing jointly two com-
modities (commodity 1 and commodity 2). Recalling the previous
wool-mutton example elaborated by Marshall (1921), we can study a two-
products-xed-proportion case so that commodity 1 and commodity 2 are
jointly derived through a composite commodity and from one unit of this
composite commodity, one unit of commodity 1 and commodity 2 are ob-
tained.
Therefore, starting with the revenue function R(q1; q2) of the joint pro-
duction monopolist, we have that:
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R(q1; q2) = p1q1 + p2q2;
where p1; q1 and p2; q2 are the prices and the quantities produced and sold
of the commodities 1 and 2, respectively. In this way, the two
complement-in-production goods have two separate markets and they are
treated as two di¤erent commodities. However, the revenue function can
be dened with respect to the quantity of the composite commodity q
since the rm cannot produce separately q1 and q2: reminding again that
the two products have to be produced in xed proportions, we have that
q = q1 = q2 and:
R(q1; q2) = p1q1 + p2q2 = (p1 + p2)q with q = q1 = q2:
Similarly, the joint production monopolists cost function is dened in
terms of the composite commodity in that complement-in-production goods
are joined in a common origin(Marshall, 1921, book V, chapter VI, page
388): therefore, using a linear cost function (with c > 0), it is dened as:
C(q) = cq = cq1 = cq2 with q = q1 = q2:7
Thus, also the prot function  for a monopolist rm producing two
complement-in production commodities is dened in terms of the composite
commodity and it is derived as follows:
 = (p1 + p2)  q   cq = (p1 + p2   c)  q:
3.2.1 Joint Production with Consumption Externalities
According to the contribution by Marshall (1921), the joint production set-
ting is not characterized by consumption externalities as the demands of the
two complement-in-production goods q1(p1); q2(p2) are generically dened.
However, the two demands can be interpreted using the features by Rochet
and Tirole (2003) so that:
q1 = D1 = N1(p1)N^2
q2 = D2 = N2(p2)N^1;
7 In this cost function characterization, we impose the simplifying condition q = q1 = q2
according to the assumption dened in chapter 1; however, removing this condition, we
can generally consider the C1 cost function C(q; q1; q2): in this way, the implicit function
theorem can be applied and the cost function can be uniquely dened in terms of the
composite commodity quantity q.
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where N^i 8i 2 f1; 2g is the value observed by the users on side j regarding
the number of users joining the platform on side i . Yet, because of the
joint production condition, the values of N^i and Ni(pi) have to be equal on
both sides so that q1 = q2: In particular, the demand function D has to be
derived accordingly:
D = D1 = D2
= N1(p1)N^2 = N2(p2)N^1
= F (p1; p2; N^1; N^2);
where F is a generic function of the two prices and of the observed
numbers of users on the two sides. The prot function that the platform
has to maximize is dened in terms of the composite commodity expressed
by the demand D as follows:
 = (p1 + p2   c)F (p1; p2; N^1; N^2):
After the maximization, the equilibrium has to be imposed by the plat-
form so that N^1 = N1(p1) and N^2 = N2(p2); while the composite demand
function D is equal to:
D = N1(p1)N2(p2):
Associated with this result, the prot function  will be:
 = (p1 + p2   c)N1(p1)N2(p2);
that is the prot function proposed by Rochet and Tirole (2003): in this
way, this latter model can be described by three elements:
1. the joint production of two commodities associated with the two sides;
2. the externalities in the demands of the two commodities;
3. the capacity of internalization by the platform
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3.2.2 The Prot Optimization
In general, in order to trace the optimal conditions in a joint production
setting, we start by calculating the optimal quantity in terms of the com-
posite commodity: for instance, studying the perfect competition analysis
by Marshall (1921), we imposed the equilibrium condition between the sup-
ply and the demand of the composite commodity bullock, so as to derive the
equilibrium quantity of bullocks SB(pEB) = q
E = DB(p
E
B):
Similarly, in the case of joint production monopoly, the maximizing con-
dition has to be imposed in the composite commodity market, so that the
optimal quantity q is given by the equality MR(q) = MC(q); where the
marginal revenue and the marginal cost are derived with respect to the com-
posite commodity. From this result, the optimal quantities (q1 = q2 = q)
and the optimal prices (p1 = p1(q1); p2 = p2(q2)) of commodities 1 and 2
can be calculated, as we can see in Figure 5.
Figure 5
Yet, due to the presence of consumption externalities, the optimal quan-
tity of the composite commodity N1(p1)  N2(p2) cannot be directly de-
rived in terms of the composite commodity price p = p1 + p2 in that
N1(p1)  N2(p2) is function of the two prices p1; p2: In this sense, this opti-
mization starts by dening the optimal price combination that maximizes
the product N1(p1)  N2(p2); independently of the composite commoditys
price p = p1 + p2:
However, this result has already been obtained by Rochet and Tirole
(2003), who dened the maximized volume of transaction V (p) in the same
way:
V (p) = max fN1(p1)N2(p2); s.t.: p1 + p2 = pg ;
from which the optimal price structure is given by the relation of the
elasticities:
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p1
p2
=
1
2
where i =   piNi 
@Ni
@pi
8i 2 f1; 2g :
Thanks to this result, the composite commodity function in terms of
the composite commodity price p = p1 + p2 is reached, as well as the prot
function  = (p  c)  q(p) where q(p) = V (p):
From this prot function, the optimal quantity of the composite com-
modity can be obtained through the equality of the marginal revenue (P (q)+
@P (q)
@q  q) and the marginal cost (c), both functions of the quantity q:
However, reporting this equality in terms of the price p; we have:
(p  c) =  q(p) 

@q(p)
@p
 1
:
By this condition, the two Lerner formulae expressed in the model by
Rochet and Tirole (2003) are resulting:8
pi   (c  pj)
pi
=
1
i
with i; j 2 f1; 2g :
3.3 Determinants of the Two-Sidedness
With this chapter, we have analyzed the model by Rochet and Tirole (2003)
and we focused on the factors that characterize this model as a two-sided
market model. In particular, we observed the presence of two elements that
are both related to the notion of two-sided markets: the non-neutrality of
the price structure; and the positive consumption externalities across the
two sides. In this sense, the model by Rochet and Tirole (2003) di¤ers from
the denition that the two authors proposed later (Rochet and Tirole, 2006),
for which the two-sidedness is a condition provided by the non-neutrality of
the price structure. Accordingly, for the denition elaborated in the article
of 2006, the Rochet and Tirole (2003) model is a two-sided market model in
which a further non-necessary element is present: consumption externalities.
8Following the reasoning proposed by Rochet and Tirole (2003), two conditions are
dened by this single equation thanks to the second result of the price structure maxi-
mization: when the price structure is optimized, the derivatives of q(p) with respect of p1
and p2 are equal, and thus we can write:
@q(p)
@p
= @q(p)
@p1
= @q(p)
@p2
:
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Then, recalling that joint production is expressing a case of multi-product
rm whose price structure is non-neutral (in line with the denition by Ro-
chet and Tirole (2006)), we can interpret the model by Rochet and Tirole
(2003) as a joint production model with consumption externalities.
To be more specic, the prot function used in this model is equal to
the joint production prot function:
 = (p1 + p2   c)q:
Then, adding a further element to this joint production framework, Ro-
chet and Tirole consider two commodities characterized by consumption
externalities, so that:
q1 = D1 = N1(p1)N^2
q2 = D2 = N2(p2)N^1:
Equating the values of q1 and q2; the composite commodity is q =
N1(p1)N2(p2) and the prot function results to be dened as follows:
 = (p1 + p2   c)N1(p1)N2(p2):
Therefore, we can conclude this chapter observing that the contribution
by Rochet and Tirole (2003) is derived by using the classic approach of
joint production introduced by Marshall (1921). The two-sidedness of this
monopoly model is indeed obtained by the joint production characteristics
of the prot function.
The two authors added another element, that is the consumption ex-
ternalities across sides, that makes more complex the demand function of
the composite commodity. Yet, including externalities in the composite
commodity demand, all the outcomes of the model by Rochet and Tirole
(2003) are reached and it can be treated as a monopoly model with two
complement-in-production commodities between which consumption exter-
nalities exist.
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Chapter 4
Two-Sided Monopoly and
Indirect Network E¤ects
In this chapter we extend the analysis of monopoly models in two-sided mar-
kets using the denition by Rysman (2009) and others: according to these
authors the necessary characteristic of two-sided markets is the presence of
cross-group externalities so that the value of platform access to each side
is higher, the more members are present on the other side (Hagiu, 2009,
page 1012).
We are going to study the model by Armstrong (2006), focusing on the
role that externalities play in the platforms optimal pricing.
Hereafter, we will stress the similarities between this model and a monopoly
model describing a rm producing two complement-in-consumption com-
modities; from this comparison, an analogy regarding the outcomes of the
two models can be established, so that it is possible to argue that the model
by Armstrong (2006) is treating consumption externalities using a structure
that is equal to the one used for the case of complementarities in consump-
tion.
4.1 The Model by Armstrong (2006)
The model by Armstrong (2006) describes a monopoly platform charging the
two sides with membership fees p1; p2 and incurring the costs c1; c2 (with
ci > 0 8i 2 f1; 2g) for each member accessing the platform on side 1 and side
2, respectively. In this way, the prot function of the monopolist platform
is the following:
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 = (p1   c1)N1 + (p2   c2)N2;
where N1; N2 are the numbers of users joining the platform on side 1 and
side 2.
It is important to notice that the features of this prot function are in
contrast with the interpretation of two-sided platforms as joint production
producers, since the cost functions of the two sides are separate and thus this
model, without considering the presence of externalities, describes a setting
in which a rm is producing two commodities with two separate production
processes.
Therefore, while the Rochet and Tirole (2003) model respects both the
denitions by Rochet and Tirole (2006) and Rysman (2009), the two-sidedness
of this model exclusively depends on the presence of externalities in line with
the denition by Rysman (2009), but in contrast with Rochet and Tirole
(2006).
4.1.1 Cross-Group Externalities
Consumption externalities across the two sides are expressed by Armstrong
through a system of four equations in which the relations between the num-
ber and the utility of users joining the platform on the two sides are de-
scribed:8<:
N1 = 1(u1) N2 = 2(u2)
u1 = 1N2   p1 u2 = 2N1   p2:
According to the rst two equations, the number of users joining the
platform on each side is an increasing function of the utility level derived by
users.1
Then, the utility levels u1; u2 are increasing in the number of users on
the other side (i > 0 with i 2 f1; 2g) and decreasing in the membership fee
charged on the same side.
Thus the cross-group externalities are a¤ecting the interactions between
the two sides in that the presence of users on one side a¤ects positively the
utility of users on the other.
As we have already evidenced in the previous chapter regarding the
model by Rochet and Tirole (2003), the externalities can be internalized
by the platform that is charging both sides with the membership fees p1; p2:
1We assume that 
0
i(ui) > 0 and 
00
i (ui)  0 8ui > 0; and i(ui) = 0 8ui  0:
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Whereas in the previous model the platform internalized the externalities
obtaining a prot function in terms of the two prices, the internalization
of the consumption externalities in the Armstrong model is obtained by
dening the platforms prot function  with respect to the utility levels of
the two groups u1; u2, so that we have:
 = (12(u2)  u1   c1)1(u1) + (21(u1)  u2   c2)2(u2);
where the prices are functions of the utility levels: pi = ij(uj)  ui
8i; j 2 f1; 2g :
4.1.2 The Prot Optimization
From this prot function  expressed in terms of the utility levels of the
two sides, Armstrong proceeds in the maximization so that the following
problem is dened:
max
u1;u2
f(12(u2)  u1   c1)1(u1) + (21(u1)  u2   c2)2(u2)g ;
whose necessary and su¢ cient rst-order conditions are the following:8>>><>>>:
@
@u1
=  1(u1) + (12(u2)  u1   c1)01(u1) + 22(u2)
0
1(u1) = 0
@
@u2
=  2(u2) + (21(u1)  u2   c2)02(u2) + 11(u1)
0
2(u2) = 0:
Writing again the two conditions in a more compact way, we have:8<:
(p1   c1)01(u1) + 2N2
0
1(u1) = 1(u1)
(p2   c2)02(u2) + 1N1
0
2(u2) = 2(u2);
and the optimal membership fee on each side can be derived:
pi = ci   jNj + i(ui)

0
i(ui)
8i; j 2 f1; 2g :
By these two equations, we can characterize the prot-maximizing mem-
bership fee for the monopolist platform: to every users on side 1, the plat-
form is charging a membership fee (p1) that is equal to the marginal cost
(c1) adjusted downward by the external benet to group 2 (2N2), and
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adjusted upward by a factor related to the elasticity of the groups partic-
ipation (Armstrong, 2006, page 672); equally, the same characterization
holds for side 2.
Finally, from the two conditions describing the optimal membership fees,
two Lerner formulae are identied also for this model:
pi   ci + jNj
pi
=
1
i(pi j Nj) 8i; j 2 f1; 2g ;
where i(pi j Nj) is the elasticity of demand dened for a given level of
participation by the other group(Armstrong, 2006, page 673), so that:
i(pi j Nj) = pi
i(ui)
 @i(ui)
@ui
=   pi
i(ui)
 @i(ui)
@ui
dui
dpi
where duidpi =  1 since Nj is considered as given, non-depending on the
price pj . Therefore we have that:
i(pi j Nj) =   pi
i(ui)
 @i(ui)
@ui
dui
dpi
=   pi
Ni
 @Ni
@pi
:
4.2 The Monopoly with Complementarities in the
Consumption
After having described the model by Armstrong (2006), we are presenting
a di¤erent multi-product model in which a monopolist is producing two
complement-in-consumption commodities. Doing so, we will evidence the
main features of this model as well as its nal outcomes and we will compare
these features and outcomes with the ones provided by Armstrong (2006).
In this monopoly model, the monopolist rm is producing two commodi-
ties, commodity 1 and commodity 2 whose demands D1; D2 are simultane-
ously depending on the prices p1; p2, so that we have:
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Di = Di(pi; pj) 8i; j 2 f1; 2g
with
@Di
@pi
< 0;
@Di
@pj
< 0 if the two commodities are complements,
with
@Di
@pi
< 0;
@Di
@pj
> 0 if the two commodities are substitutes.
Since we are interested in the case of complement-in-consumption com-
modities, this analysis and the further comments will deal with the case
(@Di@pi < 0;
@Di
@pj
< 0); still, the structure of the model does not change if we
assume substitutes commodities.
The costs of producing each single commodity are separate so that the
cost function can be decomposed in two parts:
C(q1; q2) = c1q1 + c2q2;
where q1; q2 are the quantities produced of each commodity; while c1; c2
are the two cost parameters. In this sense, the prot function of the
monopolist rm will be the following:
 = (p1   c1)D1(p1; p2) + (p2   c2)D2(p1; p2);
and it can be maximized in terms of the two prices p1; p2 :
max
p1;p2
f(p1   c1)D1(p1; p2) + (p2   c2)D2(p1; p2)g :
The rst-order conditions of this prot optimization are the following:28>>><>>>:
@
@p1
= D1(p1; p2) + (p1   c1)@D1
@p1
+ (p2   c2) D2
@p1
= 0
@
@p2
= D2(p1; p2) + (p2   c2)@D2
@p2
+ (p1   c1) D1
@p2
= 0;
and, from each condition, a Lerner formula can be expressed. Indeed we
have:
2Assuming that @
2Di
@p2i
< 0; @
2Di
@p2j
< 0; the rst-order conditions are both necessary and
su¢ cient to determine the optimum.
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(pi   ci)  @Di
@pi
+ (pj   cj)  @Dj
@pi
=  Di(pi; pj) 8i; j 2 f1; 2g :
Then, we divide each side for the term (@Di@pi ); recognizing that:
 Di(pi; pj) 

@Di
@pi
 1
=
pi
i
,
where i =  @Di@pi 
pi
Di(pi;pj)
; therefore we obtain:
(pi   ci) +
(pj   cj)@Dj@pi
@Di
@pi
=
pi
i
8i; j 2 f1; 2g :
From these equations, two Lerner formulae can be easily derived:
pi   ci
pi
  (pj   cj)
iDi
@Dj
@pi
=
1
i
8i; j 2 f1; 2g ;
or,
pi   ci
pi
 

@Rj
@pi
  @Cj
@pi

 1
iDi
=
1
i
8i; j 2 f1; 2g ;
where Rj(pi; pj) = pjDj(pi; pj) and Cj(pi; pj) = cjDj(pi; pj) are the
revenue and cost functions associated with the commodity j:
From these two formulae, we can argue that the inverse of the elasticity
of demand ( 1i ) exceeds the Lerner index (
pi ci
pi
) in case of two complement-
in-consumption commodities: indeed when the two goods are complements,
the derivative @Dj@pi is negative since an increase in the price of commodity i
leads to a lower demand of commodity j:
4.2.1 Similar Results
In this subsection we aim at comparing the two models before described
regarding consumption externalities and complementarities: in particular,
we will observe that the externalities as they are presented in the model by
Armstrong (2006) share some properties with the complementarities in the
consumption regarding how they a¤ect the pricing strategy. Moreover, we
will demonstrate that the nal outcomes of the model by Armstrong (2006)
resemble the ones derived in a context of complementarities.
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To start with the comparison, we can consider again the system of four
equations through which Armstrong (2006) describes the presence of exter-
nalities across the two sides:8<:
N1 = 1(u1) N2 = 2(u2)
u1 = 1N2   p1 u2 = 2N1   p2:
This system is dened in terms of the utility levels u1; u2 and it is de-
signed for the prot maximization; still, if the same system can be solved
in terms of the prices p1; p2; it will result that the numbers of users on the
two sides are depending on the the two prices: thus the prot function can
be presented as in the case of complementarities.
In order to show this point, let us specify the values of the two functions
with 1(u1) = iui and i > 0 8i 2 f1; 2g. Using this simple characteriza-
tion, the previous system of four equations becomes:8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
N1 = 1u1
N2 = 2u2
u1 = 1N2   p1
u2 = 2N1   p2;
and the participation levels N1; N2 can be dened in terms of the two
prices with negative derivatives:38>>><>>>:
N1 =   1
1  1221  p1  
121
1  1221  p2
N2 =   212
1  1221  p1  
2
1  1221  p2:
In this way, the prot function of the monopolist platform equals the
prots of the monopolist producing two complement-in-consumption goods:
 = (p1   c1)N1(p1; p2) + (p2   c2)N2(p1; p2);
with @Ni@pi < 0;
@Ni
@pj
< 0 8i; j 2 f1; 2g :
3Supposing that i; i 2 (0; 1) 8i 2 f1; 2g :
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Optimizing with respect to the prices p1; p2; the same outcomes of the
model with complementarities are achieved and the two models result to be
equivalent.4
Yet, it can be demonstrated that the results obtained by Armstrong
(2006) in terms of the utility levels u1; u2 are describing a similar (but not
equal) condition to the model with complementarities:
Starting with the two Lerner formulae identied for the Armstrong model,
we have:
pi   ci
pi
+
jNj
pi
=
1
i(pi j Nj) 8i; j 2 f1; 2g ;
in which the inverse of the elasticity of demand ( 1i(pijNj)) exceeds the
Lerner index (pi cipi ) by a positive factor (
jNj
pi
), similarly to the Lerner
formulae of the model with complementarities, in which ( 1i ) exceeds the
Lerner index by ( 
h
@Rj
@pi
  @Cj@pi
i
 1iNi ):
In this way, in order to compare the Lerner conditions for the two mod-
els, we may show that the factor (jNjpi ) can be expressed with an analogous
structure to ( 
h
@Rj
@pi
  @Cj@pi
i
 1iNi ) so as to emphasize that the model by Arm-
strong is presenting several similarities with the complement-in-consumption
model.
The revenue and the cost functions of each side in the model by Arm-
strong (2006) are the following:
Ri(ui; uj) = pii(ui) = (ij(uj)  ui)i(ui) 8i; j 2 f1; 2g
Ci(ui) = cii(ui) 8i 2 f1; 2g :
Then, if we compute the derivatives of Rj ; Cj with respect to the price
pi for a given level of utility uj ; we obtain:5
4 In order to evidence a straightforward result, we used a linear characterization for the
functions i(ui) 8i 2 f1; 2g ; still it is possible to dene the two participation levels N1; N2
in terms of the prices p1; p2 through a more general approach: indeed, recalling that i(ui)
is strictly increasing in ui; the inverse function can be determined (ui = 'i(Ni)) so as to
obtain the two participation levels as Ni = Ni(pj ; Nj) 8i; j 2 f1; 2g :
Then, applying the implicit function theorem to both the demand functions, we can
derive the participation levels N1,N2 as functions of the two prices p1; p2:
5Since uj is considered as given and non-depending on pi, we have that
@Rj
@uj
duj
dpi
= 0:
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@ (Rj j uj)
@pi
=
@Rj
@ui
dui
dpi
= jj(uj)
0
i(ui)
dui
dpi
@ (Cj j uj)
@pi
=
@Cj
@ui
dui
dpi
= 0:
Therefore in the Armstrong model the factor
h
@(Rj juj)
@pi
  @(Cj juj)@pi
i
can be
derived as follows:
@ (Rj j uj)
@pi
  @ (Cj j uj)
@pi
= jj(uj)
0
i(ui)
dui
dpi
:
The elasticity of demand i has already been calculated:
i =   pi
Ni
 @Ni
@pi
=   pi
i(ui)
 0i(ui)
dui
dpi
8i 2 f1; 2g ;
so that the ratio 1iNi is:
1
iNi
=   1
pi  0i(ui)


dui
dpi
 1
:
Therefore, we can reckon that the nal outcomes of the model by Arm-
strong (2006) are sharing a similar structure with the ones of the model
with complementarities in the consumption since the factor ( jNjpi ) can be
expressed as (
h
@(Rj juj)
@pi
  @(Cj juj)@pi
i
 1iNi ); indeed we have that:
@ (Rj j uj)
@pi
  @ (Cj j uj)
@pi

 1
iNi
=  

jNj
0
i(ui)
dui
dpi

 1
pi  0i(ui)duidpi
;
and thus:
@ (Rj j uj)
@pi
  @ (Cj j uj)
@pi

 1
iNi
=  jNj
pi
:
Thanks to this result, the Lerner formulae of the model by Armstrong
(2006) can be rewritten in that they are showing a specic result of the
model with complements: in the Armstrong model with externalities we
have:
pi   ci
pi
 

@ (Rj j uj)
@pi
  @ (Cj j uj)
@pi

 1
iNi
=
1
i(pi j Nj) 8i; j 2 f1; 2g ;
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while the previous model with complementarities in the consumption is
described by the following Lerner equations:
pi   ci
pi
 

@Rj
@pi
  @Cj
@pi

 1
iDi
=
1
i
8i; j 2 f1; 2g :
4.2.2 Complementarities and Externalities
From the previous comparison between the two Lerner formulae, it is pos-
sible to evidence the general common points as well as the di¤erences that
persist between the model by Armstrong (2006) and the model with com-
plement commodities.
We have to recall that the prices charged by the monopolist rm pro-
ducing two complement-in-consumption goods are di¤erent with respect to a
simple multi-production case: when the rm produces two products with in-
dependent demands, the Lerner indexes (pi cipi ) of both commodities equal
the inverse of the elasticities, and the pricing strategy of the monopolist
producing two goods is not di¤erent to the joint pricing strategies of two
monopolists, each producing one of the two goods.
Di¤erently, when the demands of the two goods are dependent so that
we can write Di = Di(pi; pj) 8i; j 2 f1; 2g ; the interconnections between the
two demands are relevant to determine the levels of prices in the markets.
In particular, in case of two complement-in-consumption goods, the inverse
of the elasticity exceeds the Lerner index for each good in that a decrease
in the price of good i raises the demand for good j: Thus, in relation to the
case of complementarities, we can assist to the subsidization of one product
in favor of the other, as it was reported by Tirole (1994):
(a)n interesting phenomenon that may arise with complements
is that one or several of the goods may be sold below marginal
cost (so their Lerner index may be negative), so as to raise the
demand for other goods su¢ ciently(Tirole, 1994, page 70).
The model by Armstrong (2006) reproduces a similar reasoning regarding
the subsidization of the two sides and this is the reason why the pricing
strategy of this model resembles the one with complements.
Indeed the subsidization among the two sides is common in many two-
sided markets and it is due to the interdependencies between the utility levels
and the demands of the two groups: for instance, payment cards are used
to subsidize cardholders and heavily charge merchants since the merchants
utility is positively a¤ected by the presence of users and thus a lower price
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for cardholders may be benecial for merchants when a larger user base is
achieved.
Yet, although cross-subsidization is a common trait of the two models,
two-sided markets and markets with two complement-in-consumption goods
are two di¤erent and separable concepts: when rms are producing two
complement-in-consumption goods, the group of users to which the supply
of these two commodities is addressed is unique: in this way the demand
functions of the two commodities Di(pi; pj) 8i; j 2 f1; 2g are the sum of
the individual demands of the same group of users, that are requiring the
two commodities at the same time. Di¤erently, users on the two sides are
clearly belonging to two di¤erent groups so that the demands regarding the
two sides are the sums of the individual demands of the two groups. Indeed
each group is demanding only one commodity: readers and advertisers; card-
holders and merchants; software developers and hardware consumers: they
all possess di¤erent characteristics and each group is demanding only the
platforms services related to its side. For this reason the two-sided users
cannot internalize the presence of the agents on the opposite side. There-
fore, while in a context of complementarities consumers can internalize the
e¤ects of consuming a joint bundle of two commodities, in presence of exter-
nalities the internalization is no more feasible; as Rochet and Tirole (2006)
observed:
the buyer of a razor internalizes in his purchase decision the
net surplus that he will derive from buying razor blades. The
starting point for the theory of two-sided markets, by contrast,
is that an end-user does not internalize the welfare impact of
his use of the platform on other end-users(Rochet and Tirole,
2006, page 646).
In this way, the pricing rule derived by Armstrong di¤ers from the one
achieved in a context of complement goods since the factors that the users on
side i cannot directly observe (uj ; Nj) are kept xed and non-depending on
the price pi : the resulting subsidization is thus a¤ected and it is reproduced
by the Lerner formulae that we nally derived:
pi   ci
pi
 

@ (Rj j uj)
@pi
  @ (Cj j uj)
@pi

 1
iNi
=
1
i(pi j Nj) 8i; j 2 f1; 2g :
From this perspective, the contribute by Armstrong (2006) appears to
be close in the outcomes with the model of complementarities: indeed one
of the main interests of the author regards the modeling of a market that
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allows the subsidization between the sides, that is a common feature of
two-sided markets as well as markets with rms producing complement-in-
consumption commodities.
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Chapter 5
Two-Sided Monopoly with
Two-Part Tari¤s
In this chapter we are going to treat two di¤erent monopoly models with
two-part tari¤s in two-sided markets so as to propose a general reasoning
regarding the pricing strategies that are feasible for a two-sided platform.
In this sense, the rst section will be devoted to the description of the
two-part tari¤s model by Rochet and Tirole (2006) that is willing to unify in
a general framework the features of the two contributions that were studied
in the previous two chapters; after a brief presentation, we will focus on the
criticism regarding the multiplicity of the nal outcomes in the model by
Rochet and Tirole (2006). In this way, we will argue that such a criticism
can be overcome by a di¤erent two-part tari¤s model that will be illustrated
in the second section using the approach by Rochet and Tirole (2003), where
externalities and joint production are both present.
Finally, we will express the results of this model identifying the per-
transaction and the membership fees charged on both sides as well as the
consumerssurplus that the monopolist is able to exploit in such a case.
5.1 The Model by Rochet and Tirole (2006)
In the article Two-Sided Markets: A Progress Report, Rochet and Tirole
(2006) dened a monopoly setting for two-sided markets trying to unify the
contributions by Rochet and Tirole (2003) and Armstrong (2006) in one
single model. In order to do that, they described a two-sided case in which
many features of both the previous models are present:
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1. the monopolist platform is charging the two sides with per-transaction
and membership fees, denoted with ai; Ai 8i 2 f1; 2g respectively;1
2. the main structure of the model by Rochet and Tirole (2003) is re-
spected; yet the numbers of users N1; N2 are depending on the fees
charged on both sides, similarly to the case by Armstrong (2006);
3. the prot optimization follows the approach of Rochet and Tirole
(2003), but the same outcomes derived by Armstrong (2006) can be
achieved.
In this way, the platforms prot function is the following:
 = A1N1 +A2N2   c1N1   c2N2 + (a1 + a2   c)N1N2;
so that the prot functions of the two models can be recalled again:
 if A1 = A2 = c1 = c2 = 0; the prot function is equal to the one
dened by Rochet and Tirole (2003):
 = (a1 + a2   c)N1N2;
 if a1 = a2 = c = 0; the Armstrong models prot function is derived:
 = A1N1 +A2N2   c1N1   c2N2:
However, in order to provide a general outcome that may be in accor-
dance with both the modelsresults, Rochet and Tirole (2006) do not op-
timize the prot function in terms of the per-transaction and membership
fees, but they consider the per-transaction pricepi dened as follows:
pi = ai +
Ai   ci
Nj
8i; j 2 f1; 2g ;
so as to express the previous prot function in terms of p1; p2:
 = (a1 +
A1   c1
N2
)N1N2 + (a2 +
A2   c2
N1
)N1N2   cN1N2
= (p1 + p2   c)N1N2:
1 In the original paper by Rochet and Tirole (2006), the two sides are called buyers
and sellers so that the fees are denoted as aB ; AB and aS ; AS ; and the participation
levels are NB ; NS :
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From this new shape of the prot function, the optimization process is
developed with respect to the two per-transaction prices2 so that the nal
optimal outcomes of the model do not identify the optimal per-transaction
and membership fees, but they are joint in the optimal level of the per-
transaction prices p1; p2: the optimal price levels are determined by the
standard Lerner formula:
p  c
p
=
1

;
where p is the sum of the two per-transaction prices (p = p1 + p2) and  is
the elasticity of volume with respect to total price:  =  pV (p)=V (p)
(Rochet and Tirole, 2006, page 654); whereas the optimal price structure is
obtained when the derivatives of the optimal volume V (p) with respect to
p1; p2 are equal:
@n1
@p1
N1
+
@n2
@p1
N2
=
@n1
@p2
N1
+
@n2
@p2
N2
:
The impossibility to derive the optimal results in terms of the per-
transaction and the membership fees is the main limit of such an outcome
and the two authors recognize this criticism inside this process observing
that:
there may be some redundancy in the pricing policy, since only
per-transaction prices pB and pS matter, whereas the platform
has a priori four degrees of freedom: (aB; AB) on the buyers
side and (aS ; AS) on the sellersside(Rochet and Tirole, 2006,
page 654).
However, we have to note that this generality or redundancyregarding
the results is necessary in order to express a model that is compatible with
two contributions presenting signicant divergences.
In this sense, the model by Rochet and Tirole (2006) has to be viewed
as a successful tentative to present a framework that unies two pieces of
literature regarding two-sided monopoly, rather than to provide a model in
which the platform charges the sides with two tari¤s aiming at optimizing
its prot and exploiting the consumerssurplus.
2 In the prevous list we have recalled that Rochet and Tirole (2006) treated externalities
as Armstrong (2006) recognizing a direct dependence between the participation levels and
the two per-transaction prices, so that Ni = ni(pi; pj) 8i; j 2 f1; 2g :
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Therefore, in order to describe such a two-part tari¤s model, we have
to limit our analysis to one of the two contributions so as to solve the
redundancy and obtain a characterization for the optimal per-transaction
and membership fees.
In the next section, we are going to provide a two-part tari¤s model using
the approach of Rochet and Tirole (2003), where the platform charges the
two groups with a non-neutral price structure and cross-group externalities
a¤ect the demand functions of the two sides.
5.2 The Two-Part Tari¤s Model
In the third chapter, we analyzed the monopoly model by Rochet and Tirole
(2003) in which the two-sided market structure is described in accordance
with the two denitions presented in the literature: the per-transaction fees
structure results to be non-neutral in determining the volume of transactions
occurring via the platform, as it is dened by Rochet and Tirole (2006);
moreover, the presence of consumption externalities in the demands of the
two sides is in line with the denitions by Rysman (2009) and others.
Furthermore, the model by Rochet and Tirole (2003) can be studied
through the notion of joint production derived by Marshall (1921) so that
two-sided markets are designed using the Marshallian approach of joint pro-
duction applied to the new contexts of network technologies and computer
science.
Hence, the structure of this model results to be more complex than the
one proposed by Armstrong (2006), that is presenting a lower capacity to
interpret the reality of two-sided markets. For this reason, we are developing
the two-part tari¤s using the approach and the basic elements of the model
by Rochet and Tirole (2003).
Before describing the procedure to derive the optimal pricing strategy
by the platform, it may be of interest to introduce some common elements
of two-part tari¤s that can be applied to all the contexts.
In his seminal article, Oi (1971) described the case of a two-part tari¤
as one in which the consumer must pay a lump sum fee for the right to
buy a product (Oi, 1971, page 77). Thus, each consumer is charged with
two di¤erent fees as well as the rms have to maximize their prot functions
in terms of the lump sum fee and the price of the product; doing so, the
consumerssurplus can be captured (at least partially) by the rms inasmuch
as all the agents still have incentives to buy the products.
Therefore, when the group of consumers is assumed to be homogeneous
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and characterized by the same demand function, each consumer will be
charged with a lump sum fee that is lower than or equal to the per-user
surplus;3 whereas the price of the product is constrained to be greater than
or equal to the marginal cost in that the part of the prot provided by the
price of the product cannot be negative.
In the case of monopoly, the monopolist rm can exploit completely
the consumers surplus when no arbitrage conditions apply on both sides
among users; then, the optimal two-part tari¤ strategy results to be the
following: the lump sum fee is equal to the per-user surplus; while the price
of the product is xed at the level of the marginal cost. This combination is
optimal in that the per-user surplus is maximized for this level of the price
of the product and thus, using the lump sum fee to exploit the consumers
surplus, also the rms prot results to be maximized.
Starting with this general result, the optimal pricing for the case of a
two-sided monopolist platform charging two homogeneous sides with mem-
bership and per-transaction fees can be computed: the nal outcomes of
this case are in line with the ones elaborated for the simple monopoly and
the overall surplus derived by the two groups is completely captured by the
platform.
Accordingly, the monopolist platform charges both sides with per-transaction
and membership fees denoted as ai; Ai 8i 2 f1; 2g ; while it is incurring
marginal per-transaction costs c > 0: As in Rochet and Tirole (2003), the
demands for the platforms services are characterized by cross-group exter-
nalities so that:
Di = Ni(ai)N^j 8i; j 2 f1; 2g ;
and the participation level Ni(ai) is a non-negative decreasing log-concave
function of the per-transaction fee ai.
Therefore, after the internalization of the externalities by the monopolist
platform the prot function presents similar characteristics to the one used
by Rochet and Tirole (2006):
 = A1N1(a1) +A2N2(a2) + (a1 + a2   c)N1(a1)N2(a2):
3When consumers are heterogeneous and they are characterized by di¤erent demand
functions, two-part tari¤s can be used by rms in order to price-discriminate the con-
sumers; in this case, all the groups will be charged with a di¤erent combination of fees (if
it is convenient to serve each group) and the overall pricing strategy is more complex in
that it has to take into consideration a further constraint related to incentive compatibility
of each strategy for each group.
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From this setting, the optimal two-part tari¤s strategy can be structured
in two parts: the constraints regarding the upper and lower bounds of the
membership and per-transaction fees are dened for the two-sided setting;
then, the platforms prot maximization in terms of the fees a1; a2; A1; A2
is computed and the optimal pricing strategy is derived.
In this way, it will result that the platform is able to exploit completely
the consumers surplus since the value of the prot function equates the
total available consumers welfare.
In order to derive such a scheme, we are proceeding in three steps:
1. the consumers surpluses on both sides are dened in line with the
ones computed by Rochet and Tirole (2003);
2. the constraints regarding the membership and the per-transaction fees
are established for two-sided markets;
3. the constrained maximization of the platforms prot in terms of the
fees a1; a2; A1; A2 is computed so as to derive the optimal membership
and per-transaction fees.
5.2.1 The ConsumersSurplus
As we have already pointed out, when rms are using two-part tari¤s they
are able to exploit the consumerssurplus by the membership fees they are
charging; thus, in order to obtain the optimal two-part pricing strategy, we
need to dene the notion of surplus and how it is calculated in a two-sided
context.
In their article, Rochet and Tirole (2003) consider the net surpluses
on each side for an average transactionas the surplus that each group of
users derives by one transaction with the other group (see Figure 6); hence,
denoting with Wi(ai) the surplus of side i derived by one transaction; we
have:
Wi(ai) =
Z +1
ai
Ni(t)dt 8i 2 f1; 2g ;
so that the sum of consumerssurpluses on both sides can be denoted with
W (a1; a2) and dened as follows:
W (a1; a2) = N2(a2)W1(a1) +N1(a1)W2(a2);
with Nj(aj)Wi(ai) 8i; j 2 f1; 2g that is representing the total surplus of
side i for all the Nj(aj) transactions occurring via the platform.
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After having dened the consumerssurplus of the two groups, we can
set the value of the per-user surplus obtained on each side as follows:
Wi(ai)Nj(aj)
Ni(ai)
8i; j 2 f1; 2g ;
where Wi(ai)Nj(aj) is the total surplus of consumers on side i after a
number Nj(aj) of transactions; while Ni(ai) represents the number of users
on side i.4
Figure 6
5.2.2 The Constraints of the Two-Part Tari¤
When we illustrated the general features of the two-part tari¤ strategy, we
observed that the membership and the per-transaction fees have to be set
with respect to some constraints: in a two-sided setting, we can notice that
the membership fee charged by the platform has to be lower than or equal
to the per-user surplus:
Ai  Wi(ai)Nj(aj)
Ni(ai)
8i; j 2 f1; 2g ;
since, in relation to a greater value of the membership fee, the consumers
have no incentives to patronize the platform. Then, we have to impose a
second constraint that xes the lower bound for the per-transaction fees so
that they have to be greater than or equal to the marginal cost:
a1 + a2  c:
4 In order to avoid an undened expression for the per-user surplus on each side, we have
to impose that the participation levels are always di¤erent to zero: Ni(ai) 6= 0 8i 2 f1; 2g :
55
In this way, the platforms prot derived by the per-transaction fees is
non-negative similarly to the previous general case in which the price of the
product has to be greater than or equal to the marginal cost.
Throughout these three constraints, the platform prot can be maxi-
mized so as to obtain feasible results for the optimal pricing strategy.
5.2.3 The Constrained Prot Optimization
At this stage, after having presented the platforms prot function as well as
the constraints regarding the fees, we can dene the maximization problem
as follows:
max
a1;a2;A1;A2
[A1N1(a1) +A2N2(a2) + (a1 + a2   c)N1(a1)N2(a2)]
s:t: : A1  W1(a1)N2(a2)
N1(a1)
A2  W2(a2)N1(a1)
N2(a2)
a1 + a2  c;
where the three constraints are determining the upper bounds and the
lower bound for the membership and the per-transaction fees, respectively.
Moreover, we have to recall the previous assumption regarding the
participation levels that have to be di¤erent to zero (Ni(ai) 6= 0 8ai) in line
with the equation of the per-user surpluses. Associated with this problem,
the Lagrangian function can be computed in the following way:
L(a1; a2; A1; A2; 1; 2; 3) = A1N1(a1) +A2N2(a2)+
+(a1 + a2   c)N1(a1)N2(a2)+
 1

A1   W1(a1)N2(a2)
N1(a1)

+
 2

A2   W2(a2)N1(a1)
N2(a2)

+
 3 (c  a1   a2) :
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Using this function, we can apply the Kuhn-Tucker conditions so that
the rst-order partial derivatives of the Lagrangian are equated to zero:58>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
@L
@a1
= A1N
0
1 +N1N2 + (a1 + a2   c)N
0
1N2+
+1

 N21N2  W1N2N
0
1

N21
+ 2
W2N
0
1
N2
+ 3 = 0
@L
@a2
= A2N
0
2 +N1N2 + (a1 + a2   c)N
0
2N1+
+1
W1N
0
2
N1
+ 2

 N22N1  W2N1N
0
2

N22
+ 3 = 0
@L
@A1
= N1   1 = 0
@L
@A2
= N2   2 = 0;
while the complementary slackness conditions are satised:
1  0 with 1

A1   W1(a1)N2(a2)
N1(a1)

= 0
2  0 with 2

A2   W2(a2)N1(a1)
N2(a2)

= 0
3  0 with 3 (c  a1   a2) = 0:
These Kuhn-Tucker conditions are necessary and su¢ cient to determine
the optimum: indeed the prot function is log-concave, recalling the log-
concavity of the participation levels Ni(ai) 8i 2 f1; 2g ; whereas all the
constraints are quasiconvex.
Analyzing all the possible cases regarding the slackness conditions, we
can argue that only when all the constraints are active the Kuhn-Tucker
conditions are satised and the maximum is reached: indeed when the ac-
tiveness of all the three constraints is imposed, we have:
5 In order to shorten the notation of the following rst-order conditions, we do not
specify the variables of the functions Wi; Ni with i 2 f1; 2g.
57
A1 =
W1(a1)N2(a2)
N1(a1)
A2 =
W2(a2)N1(a1)
N2(a2)
a1   a2 = c;
and the associated multipliers are all positive:
1 = N1(a1) > 0
2 = N2(a2) > 0
3 =  W1(a1)N 02(a2) =  W2(a2)N
0
1(a1) > 0:
Di¤erently, all the other cases are not admissible because at least one of
the participation levels are set equal to zero, in contrast with our previous
assumption (when at least one of the constraints regarding the membership
fees is not active); or because the sum of the per-transaction fees is below
the marginal cost (when the membership fee constraints are active and the
per-transaction fee constraint is not).
Thanks to this result, we can derive the condition regarding the price
structure associated with the case in which all the constraints are active.
Indeed, determining the third multiplier (3) we have met the following
condition:
W1(a1)N
0
2(a2) = W2(a2)N
0
1(a1)
0
that can be rewritten as,
@N1
@a1


@N2
@a2
 1
=
W1(a1)
W2(a2)
:
Then, using the notion of elasticity of demand with respect to the per-
transaction fee i =   aiNi 
@Ni
@ai
; we get the nal result for the price structure:
a1
a2
=
1
2
 N1(a1)
N2(a2)
 W2(a2)
W1(a1)
:
Throughout this condition, we can analyze the relationship between the
optimal per-transaction and membership fees charged in this two-part tari¤
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model: using the previous denition describing the membership fee levels,
we have:
Ai =
Wi(ai)Nj(aj)
Ni(ai)
8i; j 2 f1; 2g ;
yet, recalling the previous condition for the per-transaction fees, the values
of the per-transaction and membership fees charged on each side can be
connected:
a1
a2
=
1
2
 N1(a1)
N2(a2)
 W2(a2)
W1(a1)
 N1(a1)
N2(a2)
 N1(a1)
N2(a2)
=
1
2
 N1(a1)W2(a2)
N2(a2)
 N1(a1)
W1(a1)N2(a2)
 N1(a1)
N2(a2)
=
1
2
 N1(a1)
N2(a2)
 A2
A1
:
Using this last formula, the di¤erence between this price rule and the
optimal price structure for the monopolist platform by Rochet and Tirole
(2003) can be observed: indeed we can point out that the ratio of the fees
is function of the ratio of elasticities as in the case of a monopolist charging
only per-transaction fees; still, according to this optimal pricing rule, the
per-transaction fee structure depends also on the participation levels and on
the membership fees charged on both sides: the greater is the participation
level of side i; the higher is the per-transaction fee ai; and for a higher value
of the per-transaction fee, the consumerssurplus level Wi is decreasing as
well as the membership fee Ai.
Finally, after this analysis of the per-transaction fee structure, the opti-
mal two-part pricing strategy can be derived in all its elements: the values
of the membership fees are the following:
Ai =
Wi(ai)Nj(aj)
Ni(ai)
8i; j 2 f1; 2g ;
and they are constrained to be positive; while the optimal per-transaction
fees are described by two conditions: the optimal price level is given by the
constraint:
a1 + a2 = c;
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and the optimal price structure is associated with the values of the
membership fees:
a1
a2
=
1
2
 N1(a1)
N2(a2)
 A2
A1
;
thus we may have that one of the two per-transaction fees is negative.
Given this two-part pricing strategy the prot function by the platform is
the following:
 = N2(a2)W1(a1) +N1(a1)W2(a2);
and it is equal to the value of the sum of consumerssurplus on both sides.
5.2.4 The Exploitation of the ConsumersSurplus
We are concluding this chapter observing that the monopolist charging two-
part tari¤s exploits completely the consumerssurplus on both sides so as
to increase its optimal prot level with respect to the case by Rochet and
Tirole (2003), where only per-transaction fees are used.
In the previous model by Rochet and Tirole (2003), the total per-transaction
fee p = p1 + p2 was settled by the Lerner formula:
pi   (c  pj)
pi
=
1
i
with i; j 2 f1; 2g ;
using this equation, we can observe that the total price p exceeds the
marginal cost c by a factor pii :
p = c+
pi
i
8i 2 f1; 2g :
Associated with this feature, two results are derived: the platforms user
base, that is the overall number of end-users on the two sides, is lower
than the one observed when the platform is using the two-part tari¤s; then,
similarly to the standard monopoly models, a part of the available surplus is
not exploited either by the rm or by the consumers since we have a welfare
loss associated with the monopolistic pricing condition.
Conversely, when the platform is charging the two sides with two-part
tari¤s, all the available surplus is exploited by the platform. In particular,
consumers on both sides obtain no surplus accessing the platform because
of the optimal membership fees xed at the following level:
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Ai =
Wi(ai)Nj(aj)
Ni(ai)
8i; j 2 f1; 2g :
Moreover, welfare losses are not present in that the optimal price level
(a1 + a2 = c) is such that the platforms prot derived by the per-transaction
fee is zero; and the optimal structure of the per-transaction fees maximizes
the consumerssurplus under the budget balance condition: indeed, recalling
the previous denition for the total consumerssurplus W (a1; a2); we have:
W (a1; a2) = N2(a2)W1(a1) +N1(a1)W2(a2):
Therefore the maximization of W (a1; a2) under the budget balance will
be the following:
max
a1;a2
W (a1; a2) = max
a1;a2
[W1(a1)N2(a2) +W2(a2)N1(a1)]
s:t: : a1 + a2 = c;
and the result of this maximization is given by an optimal price structure
equal to the one obtained as the solution of the previous constrained prot
maximization. Indeed the Lagrangian function of this problem is the
following:
L(a1; a2; ) = W1(a1)N2(a2) +W2(a2)N1(a1)  (a1 + a2   c);
whose related rst-order conditions are:68>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>:
@L
@a1
= N2(a2) [ N1(a1)] + @N1
@a1
W2(a2)   = 0
@L
@a2
= N1(a1) [ N2(a2)] + @N2
@a2
W1(a1)   = 0
@L
@
= a1 + a2   c = 0:
From the rst two equations, we can derive the condition regarding the
price structure that maximizes the platforms prot:
@N1
@a1
W2(a2) N2(a2)N1(a1) = @N2
@a2
W1(a1) N1(a1)N2(a2);
6The rst-order conditions are necessary and su¢ cient to determine the optimum
considering the previous assumptions (log-concavity) regarding the functions Ni(ai)
8i 2 f1; 2g .
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that can be rewritten as,
@N1
@a1


@N2
@a2
 1
=
W1(a1)
W2(a2)
:
This equation is equal to the one obtained in the previous constrained
maximization and it leads to the same nal result regarding the price struc-
ture:
a1
a2
=
1
2
 N1
N2
 W2
W1
:
Accordingly, when the platform is adopting this two-part tari¤s strategy,
the available surplus by consumers is totally exploited by the platform and
thus the value of platforms prot in this model is greater than the prot
obtained by the platform in the monopoly model by Rochet and Tirole
(2003), where welfare losses are present and each group of consumers obtains
a surplus joining the platform.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
The conclusion of this work is devoted to the presentation of all the major
results that we obtained in the previous chapters. In this way, we will be
able to propose a nal remark that echoes the points of interest already
sketched in the introduction.
In this essay we aimed to provide a comprehensive overview regarding
the problems of the two-sided marketsdenitions as well as the implications
in the monopoly modeling.
The coexistence of two denitions in the two-sided markets literature is
the rst important result that we evidenced when the articles by Rochet
and Tirole (2006) and Rysman (2009) were compared: associated with their
contribution, Rochet and Tirole (2006) evaluated the two-sidedness of a
market by the features of the pricing strategy, so that the price structure
has to be non-neutral to determine the volume of transactions across the
two sides. Conversely, the approach used by Rysman (2009) and others
was focused on the role played by indirect network e¤ects and cross-group
externalities.
In relation to the perspective by Rochet and Tirole (2006), we presented
an innovative interpretation of two-sided markets associated with the con-
cept of joint production derived by Marshall (1921): according to this inter-
pretation, two-sided platforms are pricing the two sides as they were rms
producing two commodities in a joint production process. In this way, the
price structure is non-neutral and the interaction among the two groups of
users is the source of the joint production: since platforms have to o¤er
interactions on the two sides, they cannot provide the interaction service to
one side without providing the complementary service on the opposite one.
Yet, in order to evaluate completely the quality of this interpretation, we
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focused on the monopoly modeling of two-sided markets, arguing whether
this interpretative e¤ort can be translated with success into the various
models already elaborated.
In this sense, we derived the monopoly models by Rochet and Tirole
(2003) and Armstrong (2006) in which the two di¤erent theoretical ap-
proaches are applied. In this sense, we observed that these models present
some divergences to the extent to which the platforms charge the users; the
cross-group externalities a¤ect the demands on both sides; and the plat-
formsinternalization process is computed.
The rst di¤erence that separates the two models regards the nature of
the prices used by the platforms: while in Rochet and Tirole (2003) the
platform charges per-transaction fees to the two groups, membership fees
related to the access to the platform are studied by Armstrong (2006).
Moreover, also the optimal pricing strategies di¤er signicantly in that
they are associated with the denitions of two-sided markets considered by
the authors.
As we have already pointed out, Rochet and Tirole (2003) derive a two-
sided monopoly model in line with the denition provided by the same au-
thors, in which the non-neutrality of the price structure is the necessary
feature to dene a two-sided market.
Accordingly, in their model the optimal price structure is easily identied
as well as the optimal price levels: the ratio between the two prices is given
by the ratio of the elasticities:
p1
p2
=
1
2
;
whereas the price levels are described by the following Lerner formulae:
pi   (c  pj)
pi
=
1
i
with i; j 2 f1; 2g :
Conversely, in the contribution by Armstrong (2006), the optimal pricing
strategy is solely composed by the price levels charged on both sides:
pi = ci   jNj + i(ui)

0
i(ui)
8i; j 2 f1; 2g :
In this case it may be cumbersome to derive a simple expression for
the price structure since its characterization is not relevant according to
the denitions by Rysman (2009) and others: from their perspectives, only
consumption externalities are the necessary elements for two-sided markets,
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dened as those situations where platforms enable interactions between two
distinct groups of users, each of whom cares about the attributes of users of
the other type on the same platform(Armstrong and Wright, 2008, volume
8, page 420).
In the same way, also cross-group externalities are interpreted di¤erently:
in both models the demands of the platformsservices are positively a¤ected
by the presence of users on the opposite side: however, according to Rochet
and Tirole (2003) the observed number of users on side j (N^j) multiplies
the number of users that is accessing the platform on side i for a given price
level pi:
Di = Ni(pi)  N^j 8i; j 2 f1; 2g ;
while in Armstrong (2006) the number of users positively depends on the
usersutility perceived by accessing the platform:
Ni = i(ui) 8i 2 f1; 2g ;
and the following system of four equations describes how consumption
externalities connect the two sides:8<:
N1 = 1(u1) N2 = 2(u2)
u1 = 1N2   p1 u2 = 2N1   p2:
Finally, because of this di¤erent interpretation of externalities given by
the authors, the platforms capacity to internalize these cross-group inter-
connections are consistently changing in the two models. In Rochet and
Tirole (2003), the platform internalizes the externalities due to the joint pro-
duction nature of two-sided markets so that the two demands are equated
(D1 = D2) and the composite demand D is dened as follows:
D = D1 = D2
= N1(p1)  N^2 = N2(p2)  N^1
= F (p1; p2; N^1; N^2):
However, the joint production feature of two-sided markets is neglected
in the model by Armstrong (2006) and the platform internalizes the e¤ects
of externalities through the optimization of the prot function in terms of
the utility levels u1; u2 :
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max
u1;u2
f(12(u2)  u1   c1)1(u1) + (21(u1)  u2   c2)2(u2)g :
The revision of all these divergences suggests that the duality observed at
the theoretical level when we compared the denitions by Rochet and Tirole
(2006) and Rysman (2009), is also present in the monopoly modeling.
Furthermore, after having observed two monopoly models we can rein-
force our interpretation of two-sided platforms as joint production rms:
indeed, in the work by Rochet and Tirole (2003) the strategy in terms of
per-transaction fees of two-sided platforms is modeled similarly to the pric-
ing of joint production rms. In the standard joint production setting, the
demands of the two complement-in-production commodities are generically
dened and depending on the related prices (qi(pi) 8i 2 f1; 2g). However, if
we introduce consumption externalities in the characterization of these two
demands, we shall derive a condition that is equivalent to the one proposed
by Rochet and Tirole (2003); indeed we will have that:
q1 = D1 = N1(p1)N^2
q2 = D2 = N2(p2)N^1;
where N^i 8i 2 f1; 2g is the observed value on side j of the number of users
on side i. Then, recalling that N^i and Ni(pi) are equal on both sides
because of the joint production condition, the composite commodity
quantity will be equal to the number of transactions so that:
q1 = q2 = q = N1(p1)N2(p2) = N1(p1)N^2 = N2(p2)N^1:
Throughout this result, the interpretation of two-sided markets seems to
be improved: we have observed that the contribution of Rochet and Tirole
(2003) is not in contrast with joint production, but it can be translated in
accordance with this scheme; moreover, if we add consumption externalities
to the price structure non-neutrality, it is possible to underline the elements
that specify two-sided markets inside the joint production setting.
Whereas standard joint producers such as breeders (with leather and
mutton), or farmers (with wheat and hay) are simply characterized by multi-
production and the non-neutral price structure; two-sided markets are ap-
plying such an approach into new contexts where adoption externalities may
be important to suit the real interactions among agents.
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After having presented such a result, we concluded our work with brief
exposition of two-part tari¤ monopoly models that are connecting in a
unique environment some of the elements that a¤ect the two previous works.
The model by Rochet and Tirole (2006) is aiming at creating a general
framework able to resolve the duality of the approaches used in Rochet
and Tirole (2003) and Armstrong (2006): in this sense, this model provides
a result in terms of a new variable (the per-transaction price pi) that is
consistent with the two contributions previously described.
Still, the variable used to detect the optimal pricing strategy is a combi-
nation of the per-transaction and the membership fees; thus, in relation to
the solution of this model, we are not able to express the optimal values of
the two fees, but only the optimal combination of them. In this sense, the
model by Rochet and Tirole (2006) is overcoming the theoretical problems
of two-sided markets obtaining a result that does not address the single
optimal outcomes in terms of the platforms fees; hence, we pass from a
theoretical duality problem to an outcome redundancy.
Finally, we proposed an alternative model with two-part tari¤ in which
we tried to translate the features and the interpretation of two-sided markets
present in Rochet and Tirole (2003) in a di¤erent framework where the mo-
nopolist platform charges per-transaction and membership fees. According
to this model, the optimal levels and the optimal structure of the fees can
be derived successfully and the platform exploits completely the consumers
surplus on both sides.
The interpretation that we have expressed solves, at least partially, some
of the questions about the nature of two-sided markets and we hope that it
will bring further developments in order to investigate from a new perspec-
tive this theory and its various applications.
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